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Summary
A framework of political judgment has been rapidly emerging in recent years, linking,
within its normative and cognitive parameters, the liberalization of the international
compact (‘disembedded liberalism’) with policies of labour re-commodifiction in
advanced industrial democracies. This paper attempts to expose the social technology of
political judgment enabling the trans-ideological consensus in support of re-
commodification.  Bringing  political economy (back) into the project of discourse
theory, this analysis relates the framework of judgment guiding policy choices to the
aggregate social impact of the new economy, expressed politically in an emerging
electoral re-alignment across Europe. My leading hypothesis is that a new opportunity-
risk vector of alignment, styled by attitudes to globalisation, is opting out to replace the
capital-labour dynamics of conflict and consensus that underpinned the welfare state.
This realignment is now shaping the cognitive and normative frameworks of valid
political reason-formation within national polities.
I propose to see the particular social technology that alters the parameters of political
judgment in terms of interaction between three elements: 1) the social basis of political
interest articulation; 2) collective perceptions of relevant public goods  (the demand side
of political mobilisation); 3) the patterned policy response of political actors (the supply
side of political mobilisation).
The dynamics of interaction between these three elements are incurring (within a
constitutive, rather than causal, logic) long-term changes in the normative and cognitive
frameworks of post-industrial societies. These changes ultimately direct (enable and
constrain) the articulation of justice claims within a socially meaningful framework of
valid political reason-formation.
3I. Introduction
A common denominator behind the various national types of the post-war welfare state in
Europe has been labour de-commodification, within a political logic that attributed to the
state, rather than the market, the primary responsibility for the welfare of citizens,
dressing that responsibility in the terms of universal (within the national polity) right.1
From legal limitation of working hours, to various instruments for income maintenance
(especially means-tested benefits not predicated on employment), state-monitored social
security allowed for the (relative) decoupling between the productivist logic of marks and
the valorization of human life.
These policies were successful due to a cognitive consensus within society and among
the major political actors around a productivist logic of wealth and job creation and a
normative consensus on redistributive social justice, later enriched with components of
equality of recognition and participatory parity.
The knowledge economy of open borders that emerged within the last two or three
decades of the twentieth century contained the capacity to solidify the achievements of
the Welfare state by intensifying decommodification and enlarging its scope beyong the
boundaries of the nation-state.  The new economy brought a proliferation of the forms of
work, ownership and tenure thus providing unprecedented flexibility -- arguably, the
most progressive aspect of globalisation, as it enlarges the range of choices over a
person’s life-time, at the same time spreading the access to choices geographically. Thus,
internationally, globalisation could enable the widening of social inclusion; domestically
(within post-industrial democracies) it could increase personal autonomy through
reducing commodification.
                                                 
1  While the welfare state in continental Europe was marked by a strategy of de-commodification; its
American counterpart has been dominated by a focus on increasing access to labour market (equal
economic opportunity) which does not counter commodification.
4Instead, the policy direction within both the international and the domestic compacts (to
use the terms of Charles Beitz)2 has shifted towards neo-liberalism and re-commodification.
Within the international compact, ‘disembedded liberalism’ has become an organizing
principle of international regimes. Within the national compact, economic liberalism has
become a dominant element in the cognitive framework within which the center-left and
center-right frame their normative discourse on freedom of economic opportunity (on the
liberal right) and economic security (on the liberal left).  As a mirrored reaction to the
liberalization of Socialism and Conservatism, the extreme left and extreme right have
started to mobilize around a discourse merging social and national protection. Thus,
globalisation has become a constitutive element in the cognitive framework organizing
the political logic of the international and the national compacts (Azmanova 2004, Kriesi
et al, 2006).
Between the structural imperatives of the global political economy and the policy
mandate of the post-welfare state, globalisation literature has left a big causal gap.
However, while we may agree that structural mandates establishing the criteria for
legitimacy (answering ‘efficient at what’) are indeed exogenously created, the terms of
political legitimacy are always endogenously created, in anticipation of, and not in
reaction to, functional outcomes. Domestic publics are the ones that give particular
articulation of what are relevant risks and opportunities (the cognitive framework of the
domestic compact), as well as their fair distribution (the normative framework of the
domestic compact).  More importantly, ideological disagreements about particular policy
solutions take place within a basic structure of an overlapping cognitive consensus about
the grounds of normative validity (shared understandings of what valid arguments are).
Looking at developments within political philosophy in the past two decades of the
twentieth century, Alessandro Ferrara has observed a shift from an understanding of
normative validity based on principles to an alternative view based on an oriented
                                                 
2 Charles Beitz differentiates between two different social compacts – the domestic one between the state
and its citizens, which expresses society’s basic principles of economic justice and an international one
among states which determines the context in which countries pursue their domestic compacts. (rephrase).
5reflective judgment: “In other words, justice and normative validity are less and less
frequently understood as a matter of applying a set of universal principles to locally
specific matters and instead are ever more commonly understood as a judgement on the
justness of local matters in the light of a normative framework no less local and unique
than the matters that it should help us to address.” (Ferrara, 1999: 2) Within a normative
theory of reflective judgment we could ground the orientation of judgment, as Ferrara has
proposed, on the self-congruity or authenticity of identity. However, within a social
theory of reflective judgement we need to inquire about the social dynamics that orient
reflective judgement; that is, we need to understand how the social orients the political
representation of the world through cognitive and normative frameworks which enable
(always specific) disagreements about justice. This means that we need to instill political
economy (back) into critical social theory: what is the social mechanism triggering an
overlapping normative and cognitive consensus within which ideological differences are
articulated as meaningful dichotomies (and thus enable meaningful social disagreement
about justice)?  Bringing this to our inquiry about the renegotiation of national pacts in
the context of globalisation, we need to focus attention on the social technology that has
enabled the shift from the decommodifying framework of the Welfare State to the re-
commodifying logic of the emerging neo-liberal consensus.
In other words, if globalisation postulates risk mitigation and opportunity maximization
to be the new functional mandate of the state (within the new discourse of
competitiveness in the global economy) we must search for the intervening variable that
connects this structural mandate to policy responses. The causal connection is not policy
– that is the outcome of a political process.  It is political rationality as a framework of
valid political reason-formation that enables and constrains debates on justice.  It is at the
level of the rationality of political judgment, forms within domestic compacts, that the
interaction between the structural dynamics of trans-nationalisation, on the one hand, and
on the other, globalisation’s social impacts, translate into a particular cognitive and
normative framework that shapes policy responses.
I propose to see the particular social technology that alters the parameters of political
judgment in terms of interaction between three elements: 1) the social basis of political
6interest articulation (the axis of conflict aggregation); 2) collective perceptions for
relevant public goods  (the demand side of political mobilisation); 3) the patterned policy
response of political actors (the supply side of political mobilisation). The dynamics of
interaction between these three elements are incurring (within a constitutive, rather than
causal, logic) long-term changes in the normative and cognitive frameworks of post-
industrial societies. These changes ultimately direct (enable and constrain) the
articulation of justice claims within a socially meaningful framework of valid political
reason-formation.
My leading hypothesis is that a new opportunity-risk vector of alignment, styled by
attitudes to globalisation, is opting out to replace the capital-labour dynamics of conflict
and consensus that underpinned the welfare state. This realignment is now shaping the
cognitive and normative frameworks of valid political reason-formation within national
polities. Bringing  political economy (back) into the project of discourse theory will allow
me to relate the framework of judgment guiding policy choices to the aggregate social
impact of the new economy, expressed politically in an emerging electoral re-alignment
across Europe.
I will proceed as follows: I will first address the emergence, since the turn of the century,
of a new axis of conflict aggregation around the social impact globalisation.  Attitudes to
globalisation, and their aggregation into poles of social conflict, underpin the formation
of the cognitive and normative parameters of political judgment. Secondly, I will trace
the emergent new cognitive framework as a set of political relevant social concerns,
typically displayed as declared social concerns in contexts of electoral mobilisation. I will
finally address policy responces of actors in political society (parties), as, in the context
of liberal democracies, it is in the interaction between the demand side of political
mobilisation (public preferences) and the supply side (policy responses) that the various
cognitive and normative parameters of domestic compacts, to a great extend, are shaped.
In conducting the analysis, I will limit myself to the old 15 EU member-states.
71.  The social conflicts of globalisation
The aggregate social impact of globalisation has brought about a new axis of social
conflict around the distribution of the risks and opportunities generated by the new
economy -- the information-technology stage of the post-industrial economy of open
borders. Very significantly for this analysis, it is the patterned distribution of risks and
opportunities that has translated the perceived reality of globalisation into particular
social conflicts, triggering, in turn, policy change.
As well documented in academic research, the economy has induced profound changes in
the organisation of work and lifestyle patterns throughout society; the changes in the
organisation of economic activity have in turn created new status cleavages in advanced
industrial democracies (Offe 1985, Inglehart 1997 ;  Castells 2000, Beck 1992 ; Carnoy
1998). The new economy has revolutionised existing social and occupational structures,
diversified the forms of ownership, created new career opportunities and flexible
employment options, which in turn has increased personal chances and choices over
lifetime.  On the other hand, it fostered a proliferation of diffused risks (or at least of
public perceptions of such), as the economies of open borders allegedly reduced the
political capacity for dealing with ‘threats coming from abroad’ – immigration, job
outsourcing, global spread of diseases or the ubiquitous risks (rather than particular
threats) of terrorism. In the last generation, wealth stagnation has become intertwined
with insecurity for workers in the middle of the economy, while those at the top have
become even richer and many poor workers have increased their wealth share (Sennett,
2006).
8While most studies of globalisation observe the uneven distribution of new social risks, I
see social differentiation arising around two different vectors of globalisation – a
quantitative one, linked to the globalisation of capitalism in the context of open borders,
and a qualitative one, linked to information technology.  These two vectors of
globalisation are causing varied types of distribution of opportunities and risk within
capital and labour, rather than between capital and labour.
Within the qualitative dimension, skills-based technological change of the last decade has
produced a shift in demands in favour of highly skilled labour, especially in industries
producing, or making extensive use of, information and communication technology (the
new economy)3. The employment and earnings prospects of unskilled and semi-skilled
workers in the manufacturing sector (Old Economy), have been worsened as a result of
competition from developing economies (and jobs lost to outsourcing). The uneven
distribution between opportunities and risks concern also capital. Industries linked to the
Old Economy have seen their gains decrease. Studies show that the biggest increase in
wealth within the past decade has not been based on ownership of productive capital, as
on the use of new technology in economies of scale which globalisation offers. The
opportunities are increasing among those whose fortunes are tied to the “new economy” –
cutting-edge, global businesses such as financial services, media and high-tech. (Sennett,
2006). Here again, the main factor is not ownership of productive capital, but
occupational link to the new economy.
Thus, the distribution between opportunities and risk does not follow a capital-labour axis
(as typically during the first three quarters of the twentieth century), but cuts accross it.
Both capital and labour linked to traditional industrial sectors have become more exposed
to risk through higher exposure to competition  – the effect of open border policies.
                                                 
3 For certain professional categories the new economy has meant increased employment opportunities, rapid career
advancement and valuable job flexibility. Indeed, the pursuit of more than one career in a lifetime is gaining ground
among the younger generations in Europe. Studies show that increasing number of professionals in their thirties and
forties are leaving stable well-paid jobs – not because of the economic downturn but to gain more control over their
lives. This has been beneficial for some of the traditionally weaker sections of the population, such as working mothers,
allowing them the flexibility they needed to combine child-rearing with a career.
9Overall, the distribution of both social status and wealth does no longer follow the
capital-labour dynamics that defined politics in Europe in the past century. The defining
factor of status and wealth distribution is the particular combination between the
qualitiative and quantitative dimentions of globalisation – open borders and information
technology that also directs the distribution of opportunities and risks. Thus, it is the
occupational location in the axis New-Old economy, rather than within the capital-labour
axis, that directs the uneven distribution of opportunities and risks.
The most significant social impact of the new economy has been the flexibilisation of
existing class distinctions due to increased professional mobility and proliferation of
forms of ownership and tenure within a person’s lifetime. Throughout the twentieth
century, occupational categories, such as ‘blue-collar’ and ‘white-collar’ workers, had
already infused economic class distinctions.4  However, a critical peculiarity of the new
economy is that it increases the speed of entry and exit between professional and social
groups, thus putting an end to the relative fixity of personal identity to one
occupational/class group within an adult lifetime. What gains maximum relevance for
people is their chance (and not existing position) of upward, or risk of downward,
mobility.  Hence, the increased salience of the risk-opportunity vectors in politics, which
start to challenge the old capital-labour cleavage. (Azmanova 2004b)
Rather than increasing the middle class constituency, the new economy deepens social
differentiation along the opportunity-risk positioning of occupational groups. This new
class differentiation along the lines of career prospects inherent in the new economy
furnishes the two large constituencies of a new (opportunity-risk), political cleavage.
These dynamics, in turn, change the grounds of political identification and the ideological
basis of competition between parties.
                                                 
4 Under the impact of the new economy ‘the traditional form of work’ based on full-time employment in a specific
occupation and entailing a ‘career pattern over a life cycle’ is being eroded away (Castells, 2000: 290). This has led to
the appearance of the ‘portfolio person’, a person without permanent attachment to any particular occupation or
organization. (Gray,1998: 71-2, 111).
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Studies showed that voters’ perception of the way the EU relates to globalisation has
been a common denominator in both positive and negative attitudes to the draft EU
Constitution. Surveys indicated that the ‘no’ vote, which cut across left and right
ideological loyalties, was motivated mostly by fear of job delocalisation, fear of
immigration, and too much economic liberalisation. The ‘yes’ vote, which united parts of
the centre-left and centre-right, was driven by the vision of the EU as helping member-
states to cope with globalisation - from enhancing national competitiveness in the world
market, to providing a constitutional codification to popular participation and the
European social model.5
Thus, approval and rejection of the European Constitution run not along the ideological
lines of the traditional left-right dichotomy, but along that of the risk-opportunity
dilemmas of globalisation, forming the new poles of political identification.
The hypothesis of a new cleavage within the demand-side of political mobilisation (one
that cuts across, rather than along the capital-labour cleavage), is enforced by evidence
that the social background of typical electoral groups associated with the Left and the
Right is also changing. Surveys of recent elections in indicate that the typical voter for
the Center-Left is female, aged 25-30, educated, in middle or higher management or the
civil service, rather than the quintessential blue-collar male worker. In contrast, he socio-
professional profile of the extreme right is male, working and middle class, unemployed,
self-employed and small traders (Miguet, 2002, Clift 2001, Christofferson, 2003;
Pennings and Keman 2003). Overall,  the emergence of an opportunity-risk axis of social
differenciation which cuts across the capital-labour dynamics of conflict, has enabled the
cross-class electoral alliances which have become typical of reformed Socialism.
(Azmanova, 2004;  Clift, 2001).
                                                 
5 Commission  Européenne, “La Constitution européenne : Post-Référendum France”. Rapport Flash
Eurobaromètre 171; Terrain: 30 & 31 mai 2005, Publication: juin 2005.
European Commission, “ The European Constitution: post-referendum survey in the
Netherlands”, Flash Eurobarometer 172.  Fieldwork: 02/04 June 2005, Publication: June
2005.
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2. Shifts in political cultures and public agenda (the demand side of political
mobilidsation)
The formation of new framework of reference for political mobilisation and policy-
making is taking place through a series of transformations within the political culture on
the continent.  I understand political culture as shared public attitudes to power and
societal expectations about the style and substance of governance – attitudes which define
the overlapping cognitive and normative understanding of the basic relationship between
state and citizens despite ideological differences between the main ideological families of
the Left and the Right.  After outlining the political culture enabling the welfare state
consensus, in what follows I will examine recent transformations. This will allow me to
sketch the logic in which particular social concerns linked to the new economy translate
into collective perceptions of the nature and rationality of politics.
Although class-based ideological conflicts have defined the main political families in
Europe throught the twentieth century, the post-war welfare state consensus in Europe
was a fruit as much of the centrist nature of European conservatism, as it was of the
strong leverage of organised labour.  It is the union between the patriarchal culture of
European conservatism (which before the 1970s never fully embrace free-market
capitalism) and the Left’s culture of social solidarity that provided the trans-ideological
consensus on the ‘social market’ economy of the welfare state. The centrist conservatism
of the German Christian Democrats, for instance, provided a comfortable institutional
framework for the Welfare State in much of Germany’s post-war existence (it has been
the largest party in every election except in 1972 and 1998.)6 The conservative-socialist
overlap on social policies made possible the red-blue coalitions in most governments with
proportional electoral systems, such as the Netherlands and Belgium.
The policy debate of the welfare state revolved around economic growth, market
regulation and social transfer systems.  Its cognitive framework revolved around a
                                                 
6 The designer of Germany’s post-war “social-market economy” was Ludwig Erhard, a
Christian Democrat.
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productivist logic: the shared understanding that growth and employment are foundations
of the domestic compact. The normative framework of political mobilisation revolved
around issues of redistribution, later enlarged by issues of recognition and representation
(the New Left agenda).  In these debates the logic of social justice was monolithic: social
solidarity, politically secured at state level was rarely in contradiction with trans-national
social solidarity and aligned with a liberal socio-cultural outlook. This cohesive idea of
social justice in which national worker solidarity was not at odds with international social
justice gave rise to the notion of a European Social model despite difference between
national models.  The trans-European consensus on the Welfare State was enhanced in
the 1970s with the rise of the New Left around issues of identity politics (valorisation of
difference) and global ecological concerns.  The New Left added a counter-productivist
dimension to the European Social model, which transformed the Welfare State consensus
(so far productivist in its logic), into a consensus on Sustainable Development, where for
the first time the tension between the common productivist interests, linked to the ‘old
economy’ and the anti-productivist values of the new economy was acknowledged.  Yet,
the new left political formations which diverged from the capital-labour axis of conflict
only added a new element to the old political spectrum, without revolutionising the
political culture of post-war Europe.
In recent years the cognitive and normative framework of political culture has been
transforming as a result of the formation of a new security-and-safety agenda with four
constitutive elements: physical security, political order, cultural estrangement, and
employment insecurity, as the economic component of the mix. (Azmanova 2004a)
Symptomatic of this shift is the new way in which the issue of unemployment appears in
political discourse: The old paradigm is concerned with employment in terms of overall
growth and efficiency, while the new one focuses upon unemployment in terms of fear,
loss, and marginalisation.  In a neo-liberal economy marked by global economic
competition and downsized labour markets, job insecurity (rather than unemployment
rates) is a form of discontent of a different order than the standard evaluations of short-
term economic performance.
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This is an agenda in which concerns with income stability and physical safety, on the one
hand, and on the other, of competitiveness in the global marketplace, have replaced the
agenda of economic growth, market regulation and social transfer systems typical of the
European Welfare State.
It is important to stress that the order-and-security agenda emerged prior to the economic
crisis at the turn of the century which revived economic discourse, this time within the
new terms of securitisation. This means that initially public anxieties were triggered by
the diffused risks associated with globalisation, not by economic crisis, which only added
an economic dimension to the securitisation of the political agenda.
This new security agenda does not accord well with the theoretical forecasts of
postmaterialist theory, neither in the terms of Ulrich Beck’s account of contemporary
societies as ‘risk society’, nor in those of Inglehart’s diagnosis of the post-modern shift.
In Beck’s account, the distributional conflicts over ‘goods’ (property, income, jobs) that
characterised the industrial society, have been replaced by distributional conflicts over
‘bads’, such as the risk of nuclear technology, genetic research, or environmental crises
(Beck, 1992).  Postmaterialist theory presents this change as part of the post-modern shift
from economic factors to life-style factors as the main determinant of survival, as a result
of which concerns with materialist values emphasising physiological sustenance and
safety give way to ‘post-materialist values prioritising ‘quality of life issues, human right,
self-esteem and individual expression (Inglehart 1997).
However, the risks associated with the social effects of globalisation can hardly be
described as post-materialist and post-economic issues (of identity and rights, or quality-
of-life concerns with the environment). At the core of the new agenda is a concern with
job insecurity (or more generally access to the labour market) and physical safety.
Although employment insecurity is, indeed, a form of discontent distinctive from
‘standard’ evaluations of short-term economic performance, in its nature it is an
economic, rather than a quality-of-life issue. As for ‘physical safety’, it does not figure in
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the inventory of post-materialist, quality-of-life values (such as freedom or clean
environment), which the transition to post-industrial society makes predominant.
The new public agenda of politically relevant issues has incurred a series of changes in
the political culture of the continent – changes that alter the framework of valid political
reason - formation.
The most tangible such change is the shared, trans-ideological concern with the quality of
governance and the rising demands for more and better public goods  (political safety,
better education, more efficient healthcare, etc.). It is exactly the provision of public
goods (which compensates for the risks of globalisation) that is the intervening variable
between securitisation of public expectations and culture of governance. The normal
response of any government that is open to diffuse external risks is the compensation
strategy: to increase the provision of public goods, as it cannot act preventively to
diffused risk (Cameron, 1978). What for the population is more and better government –
especially in a Europe accustomed to dirigisme – ‘more and better government’ to the
government means the provision of ‘more and better public goods’. Indeed, popular
pressure for improved governance started in the mid- 1990s, when the sense of
uncertainty was gathering momentum throughout and despite the economic boom. The
quest for political safety, combined with the quest for better governance, often resulted in
rise of support to extreme-right parties.  However, the June 2004 European elections gave
fresh evidence that we are facing a change in political culture, not just a re-alignment to
the right: in countries where the demand for political accountability could be channelled
through new political formations (the Dutch Transparent Europe party or the vote for
Hans-Peter Martin in Austria), the vote for previously successful far-right parties here
significantly dropped.
The “order and safety” overhaul of the political agenda generally translated into an
increasing support for right-wing political platforms that put the stress on security and
authority.  With safety becoming the core concern (especially for the urban populations in
Europe, which have been the traditional supporters of left parties), the anti-establishment
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reaction at the turn of the century fed into an extreme-right vote. Although right-wing
populism is currently receding, public preferences for order and stability do not falter. In
fact, it is the incorporation of the safety discourse into the political rhetoric of mainstream
left- and right-wing parties (the mainstreaming of the extreme-right agenda) that explains
the withdrawal of support to right-wing populism, not the diminished relevance of the
security-and-order agenda.
The growing demand for good governance was the first trans-ideological alteration
within Europe’s political culture that globalisation brought about. The mainstreaming of
the extreme-right agenda was the second.  The third such alteration was the
mainstreaming of the New Left agenda, as identity politics was also embraced by the
Right, giving new life to discourses on European exceptionality, or the value of the
national, this time from the point of view of the justice of neglected (national and sub-
national) collective identities. Within this third shift is also the mainstreaming of the
global ecological agenda, which has been emphatically embraced by some conservative
parties.
The fourth, and last, shift in political cultures is the eclipsing of the post-materialist
agenda of the 1980s and 1990s by the risk agenda of the early twenty-first century. This
is at the root of the drop of electoral support for Green parties, as part of the traditional
social constituencies of the Greens gives preference to countering economic risk over
pursuing non-material goals.
These four shifts in the political culture (shared public preferences beyond ideological
differences), namely-- the increased demand for quality of governance, the
mainstreaming of the extreme-right and the post-materialist agenda, and the eclipsing of
the latter by the opportunity-risk agenda of the new economy-- has enabled a very
peculiar clustering of political preferences around two poles: social protectionism and
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cultural exclusion, on the one side, and social liberalism and cultural cosmopolitanism,
on the other.  Without the appearance of a new political culture, there would have been
too strong ideological, as well as structural (party system) obstacles for traditional left
constituencies to embrace a sovereigntist and anti-internationalist stance, or traditional
right constituencies to embrace explicitly egalitarian positions, as we are seeing in the
discourse on the Polish Plummer (from the left) and the anti-globalisation discourse on
the right.  This amalgamation between issues of social justice and concerns of governance
in which demands for social safety (previously in the ideological terrain of the left)
coincide with a sovereigntist impulse (previously typical of right) are the outcome of
deep alternations in shared public perceptions on what are valid reasons in the
formulation of policy demands.
3. Political realignment (the supply side of political mobilisation)
Even if the recent policy shifts and electoral dynamics have not yet crystallised in well-
articulated re-alignment (as national political systems are resisting the described new
tendencies), there is enough evidence to suggest that, at the turn of the century, Europe is
entering a new political era. What shapes this new era is the risk-opportunity dilemma of
globalisation, which is disrupting established political identities and electoral affinities.
The new ideological conflicts around the distribution of globalisations risks and
opportunities cut across, and not along, the capital-labour dichotomy which has formed
the political families of the Left and the Right throughout the 20th century in Europe. As
this new vector of alignment is challenging the political cultures of European Socialism
and Conservatism, it is doing away with the Welfare State consensus, which is now being
dissolved into two poles: on the one hand, a centre-left and centre-right espousal of
economic liberalism and, on the other hand, left-  and right-wing protectionist efforts at
resisting globalisation.
Signs of the transition from ‘left-right’ to ‘opportunity-risk’ cleavage abound in the
campaigning of parties.  Tellingly, discourses about national sovereignty, political order,
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and threat of cultural estrangement, typical of the ideological right, and discourses about
social justice, common in the ideological terrain of the left, have merged into a new
sanctification of the social potency and cultural supremacy of the nation-state. This
double – political and social-- sovereigntist impulse mobilised the particular rejection of
the Constitutional Treaty for Europe in France and the Netherlands in spring 2005.
Thus, at the 2005 referendum on the Draft Constitutional Treaty for Europe, threats from
globalisation made parts of the Left abandon international worker solidarity in favour of a
sovereigntist discourse, so far typical of the Right. Henri Emmanuelli (a French Socialist
MP and one of the leaders of the No campaign) thus argued that “the European
Commission, under the sway of Anglo-Saxon liberals is threatening to erode workers’
protections and accelerate the ‘delocalisation of workers’ jobs to China.”7 On the right,
fear of globalisation was primarily expressed by opposition to Turkey’s entry into the
Union,  but it was invariably linked to a social protectionist discourse, on which the Left
lost its monopoly. Charles Pasqua, the Gaullist senator and former Interior Minister
argued, “Federal, ultra-liberal, Atlanticist – such is the Europe in which we have been
living since Maastricht [The EU treaty that paved the way for the euro in 1992]  and such
is the Europe that is being celebrated in this constitution”8. This openly anti-market
rhetoric is new for the Right and has been recorded in the electoral rhetoric of the
extreme right only since the late 1990s (Bastow, 1997).
Thus, the ‘no’ vote at the referendums seems to be expressing a quest, across left- and
right- political identifications, for social protection (against the ‘Polish plumber’), and
national protection (against the Turkish immigrant). In contrast to the pure sovereigntist
position against EU integration, which had systematically marked the stance of right-
wing parties in earlier years, the rhetoric against enlargement (both the accomplished
accession in 2004 of post-communist states and the prospective accession of Turkey) has
                                                 
7Le Monde, 28 May 2005.
8 Quoted in John Thornhill, “Paris Follies: A French insurrection may mean Europe’s constitution hits the
dust”,Financial Times, 6 April, 2005; p. 13.
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been systematically linked to loss of jobs and social standards as a result of increased
competition. Both positions – that of social and that of national protection – are
expressions of a very similar reaction against the global economy of open borders.
As the new faultlines of conflict-aggregation run not along the established vectors of left-
right ideological alignment, but across them, it has set off a crisis in the ideological
families of the Left and the Right, and has triggered pressures for political re-alignment.
The most recent such development has been the rise of the centrist candidate in the
French Presidential elections (Francois Bayrou) and the prospects for a new party to
compete in the June general elections.
Thus, a symptom of on-going realignment on the level of political society is the merging of
left and right ideological programmes and their ideological re-organisation along new
fault-lines. Politics within the last decade has become dominated by a fusion between
centre-right and centre-left platforms into a new policy paradigm that combines a stress
on safety and authority (inherited from the traditional political right) and an emphasis on
economic liberalism and labour flexibility (the core of Third Way social liberalism).
Hence, although the political families of the Left and the Right nominally still exist, they
have developed a common ideological platform, centred on the opportunities inherent in
the neo-liberal, knowledge economy. On the other side of the political spectrum are
parties and their constituencies for which the new economy incurs rising risks: the fruits
of labour-market flexibility, which translate into lower incomes and reduced social
protection.
Therefore, despite preserved differences in political culture, we can assert that the new
policy axis that aligns the old centres and the old extremes is the opportunity – risk divide
of the new economy. On this basis a realignment is taking place between centre and
periphery, between, on the one hand, the centre-left and centre-right midpoint, and, on the
other, the circumference of far-right and radical-left parties. In this new alignment, the
new centre (a simultaneous shift of the moderate left and right to the centre) becomes one
of the poles in the political axis, embracing the ‘opportunity’ side of the dilemma, while
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the far-right and radical-left constitute the opposite pole responding to societal fears of
the hazards of the new economy of increased competition and open borders.
The old left and right extremes have come to overlap on two policy lines: First, in their
protectionist reaction to economic and social risk. The far-right is abandoning its
economic liberalist stance and embracing social protectionism. With this, a major policy
differentiation between the radical-left and the far-right is lost. Second, the old left and
right extremes have come to converge on the basis of their increasing preference to
national, at the expense of international solidarity. The fear of competition from
immigrants on the low-skills labour market leads the traditional blue-collar constituencies
of the radical-left to embrace, more or less explicitly, a nationalist reaction to global
borders.
The centre-left and the centre-right (liberalising) political elites that came to power in the
last rounds of elections in Europe represented the opportunity pole of the new alignment.
With its stress on social and national protectionism, the French and Dutch rejection of the
European Constitutional Treaty in the spring 2005 referendums was the united voice of
the risk pole of the new political cultures, against the centre-left and centre-right
consensus on the EU’s vocation to maximise the opportunities of globalisation.
As a reaction to globalisation, a new link between social and cultural identities is
emerging: the discourse against the Polish plumber (against loss of jobs) and against the
Turkish immigrant (alien culture) are similar, in their nature, reactions to globalisation.
The valorisation of national sovereignty (and, with that, national cultures) has been
enhanced by broad negative reactions against the loss of jobs and reduced levels of social
protection incurred by the new economy of open borders. This link between the social
and the political identification is enabled by the described political re-alignment:
arguments of national sovereignty (territory of the right) and of social protection
(territory of the left) are marking a new pole of electoral alignment around a RISK vision
of globalisation and European integration:  while the extreme right is abandoning
economic liberalism for social protectionism, the extreme left is abandoning international
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social solidarity for national worker solidarity. The opposite pole of the political
spectrum is emerging around an OPPORTUNITY vision of globalisation, as the
Socialist-Conservative consensus of the Welfare State is being replaced by that of social
liberalism (Third Way), as the centre-left and centre-right undergo internal liberalisation.
Conclusion:
Within the political paradigm typical for the twentieth century, the main ideological
families of the Left and the Right in Europe formed around the capital-versus-labour
dynamics of conflict. At the same time, the policy consensus on the welfare state rested
on a shared cognitive framework around the productivist logic of the capital-labour
interaction, and a normative framework around economic redistribution.  This provided
the underpinning for the policies of de-commodification that European states, in different
models, undertook in the second part of the twentieth century.  However,  with the
emergence of social conflicts around the social effect of globalisation (the risk-
opportunities vectors of the new economy), a new cognitive framework emerges around
issues of competition (rather than growth), as well as a new normative framework within
which the old issue of economic equity is replaced by concerns with access to the labour
market (economic opportunity).  The combination between a cognitive framework
centered on competition and physical safety and a normative one centered on  economic
opportunity is creating a new ‘normality’ – a new alignment both at the supply and
demand side of political mobilisation. Within this new normality, issues of social and
cultural protectionism converge at the expense of international social solidarity; the
welfare state policies of de-commodification have lost its basic political rationality: the
replacement of the growth agenda with that of competitiveness make it cognitively
impossible for de-commodification policies to be considered as relevant options in a
context of global competition. At the same time, the replacement of social equity with
issues of access to the labour market has made re-commodification also a matter of social
justice.  The emergence of this cognitive and normative framework of political culture
within which national compacts are renegotiated enables the translation of disembedded
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capitalism into the policies of re-commodification which center-Left and center-Right
governments in Europe come to embrace in the early twenty-first century.
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